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The Statutory Trust Fund Under IRC
§ 7501 (a) Versus Administrative
Expenses In Bankruptcy
In re Halo Metal Products, Inc.'
On August 18, 1967, Halo Metal Products filed a petition for
an arrangement under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act. Pursuant
to section 342 of Chapter XI,8 Halo was continued as a debtor-inpossession. During its operation as such, Halo paid wages to its

1. 419 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1969).
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-99 (1964). Chapter XI allows a debtor, without suffering
complete liquidation, to extend and settle unsecured debts by agreement with a
majority of his creditors and with court approval.
3. 11 U.S.C. § 742 (1964). A receiver or trustee maX be appointed to manage
the debtor's property during the arrangement [11 U.S.C. § ,32 (1964)] or the debtor
may continue to manage his property under court control.
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employees and became liable to the federal government for sums withheld from those wages for income and F.I.C.A. taxes.4 On November
22, 1967, Halo was adjudged a bankrupt; liquidation followed. The
sum realized from the sale of Halo's assets exceeded the government's
claim for withheld monies by only a few hundred dollars. If that
claim were first paid, as the government contended it must be under
the trust fund language of section 7501 (a) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, then claims for administrative expenses would not be
fully paid. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, affirming
decisions of the referee and the district court,5 refused to find a trust
in favor of the United States for the withholdings.
In earlier decisions three other circuit courts of appeal 6 had not
only recognized the trust, but had also held that the government was
not required to trace specific funds because of the official status of the
debtor-in-possession paying the wages.' Although the Supreme Court
could have phrased its holding in a 1966 case' so as to agree with the
Halo position, it expressly declined to do so. On the other hand, in
1964 the Third Circuit did rule, without significant discussion and
on somewhat different facts, that the trust fund language of section
7501 (a) is subordinate to the priority language of section 64 of the
Bankruptcy Act.9 The reasoning of the Halo opinion and of the Third
Circuit is that the United States is at no time entitled to recover on
a section 7501 (a) trust theory in bankruptcy. Under this reasoning
the United States could not recover withheld taxes even if it could
trace them to a separate bank account. Nor, it seems, could the government assert a trust claim where the bankrupt was, in fact, enriched by
taxes actually paid to him by a third-party tax debtor.' 0
Ordinarily, property held by the bankrupt as trustee does not
pass to his creditors, but is set aside for the beneficiary by the trustee
in bankruptcy." In Halo the court concluded that section 7501 (a)
did not enable the government to gain this super-priority. It gave
three reasons: first, the court read the first sentence of section 7501 (a)
as subjected by its second sentence to the priorities in section 64(a)
of the Bankruptcy Act ;1 second, the court pointed to Supreme Court
decisions which had held that section 64(a) bankruptcy priorities
override priorities granted to the federal government by non-bank4. Withholding was pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101, 3102 (1964) (Federal Insurance Contributions Act) and 26 U.S.C. § 3402 (1964) (income tax).
5. 302 F. Supp. 614 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
6. The Second, Sixth and Ninth Circuits: In re Airline-Arista Printing Corp.,
156 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd per curiam, 267 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1959);
Hercules Serv. Parts Corp. v. United States, 202 F.2d 938 (6th Cir. 1953); United
States v. Sampsell, 193 F2d 154 (9th Cir. 1951 ).
7. See notes 49-56 infra and accompanyng text.
8. Nicholas v. United States, 384 U.S. 678 (1966).
9. In re Connecticut Motor Lines, Inc., 336 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1964).
10. For example, those excise taxes discussed at notes 28, 30, 31 infra and accompanying text.
11. 4A W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTcY 1170.2511] (14th ed. 1969). See, e.g., Todd v.
Pettit, 108 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1939) ; In re Coffin, 152 F. 381 (2d Cir. 1907) ; In re
Tate-Jones & Co., 85 F. Supp. 971 (W.D. Pa. 1949).
12. 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1964).
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ruptcy legislation such as section 3466 of the Revised Statutes;13
and finally, the court concluded that section 64(a) embodies a strong
and overriding policy against such a government priority, pointing
to parallel trends in the development of section 64 which reflect a
growing recognition of the inequity of extending to the government
extraordinary preferences over other creditors and an increasing
realization that sound bankruptcy administration depends upon insuring payment of expenses necessarily incurred in such administration.
I.

INTERPRETATION OF SECTION

7501(a)

Section 7501(a) reads as follows:
General Rule. - Whenever any person is required to collect
or withhold any internal revenue tax from any other person and
to pay over such tax to the United States, the amount of tax so
collected or withheld shall be held to be a special fund in trust
for the United States. The amount of such fund shall be assessed,
collected, and paid in the same manner and subject to the same
provisions and limitations (including penalties) as are applicable
with respect to the taxes from which such fund arose.
The Seventh Circuit takes the position that the second sentence of
this section makes the trust fund imposed by the first sentence subject
to the same status in Halo's bankruptcy as an unsecured claim for
taxes incurred by Halo itself. Such a claim arising during a Chapter
XI arrangement shares only a pro rata priority with all other administrative expenses of the arrangement 4 and is subordinate to administrative expenses of the liquidating bankruptcy under section 64(a) (1).5
The court sees the section 64(a) scheme as an applicable "provision or
limitation" within the meaning of the second sentence.
There are several problems presented by this reading. When one
looks at the theoretical operation of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act,'" he sees the employee earning a periodic wage from which
the employer will withhold a certain percentage, which sum the employer will turn over to the government to satisfy the employee's tax
obligation. Why should the sums withheld from the employee ever
13. The statute dates back to 1797. Ch. 20, § 5, 1 Stat. 515. It is now 31 U.S.C.
§ 191 (1964). Section 3466 declares a government priority in insolvency:
Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent, or whenever
the estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of the executor or administrators,
is insufficient to pay all the debts due from the deceased, the debts due the United
States shall be first satisfied ....

The statute would be invoked only when the government competes as an unsecured
creditor. Any lien or other secured claim would be governed by the usual priorities
among secured claimants.
14. See, e.g., Missouri v. Earhart, 111 F.2d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 1940).
15. As of 1952, the administrative expenses of a liquidating bankruptcy which

supersedes another debtor-relief proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act are granted a
sub-priority within section 64(a) (1) and are paid before the administrative expenses
of the superseded proceeding.
16. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101-26 (1964).
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become a part of his employer's estate or be used to pay administrative expenses or to satisfy claims of the employer's creditors?" The
Halo court did not discuss this difficulty. It is true that withholdings
have been viewed as taxes due from the employer. In United States
v. New York,' 8 it was held that the government's claim to social
security withholdings upon the employer's bankruptcy would fall within section 64(a) (4).19 The obligations of the employer were regarded

as having all the characteristics of a tax on the employer himself,
being imposed upon the employer regardless of whether he had in fact
made deductions from his employees' wages.2" The question of the
status of the withholdings arose when New York argued that the
federal claim ought to fall within section 64(a) (5) as a mere debt
claim, rather than within section 64(a) (4) as a claim for taxes due
and owing by the bankrupt. The conclusion that a claim for the particular monies withheld in the New York case was a claim for taxes
due and owing by the bankrupt employer ought not to be silently
absorbed in Halo. The government did not there contend for any status
higher than that of section 64(a) (4), and nowhere in the opinion in
United States v. New York does the Supreme Court mention section
7501 (a) and the special status that section gives to the withheld sums.
Moreover, it is not at all clear, despite the authorities cited by
the court, that "provisions and limitations" as used in the second sentence of section 7501 (a) would encompass bankruptcy priorities. The
sentence reads, "The amount of such fund shall be assessed, collected,
and paid in the same manner and subject to the same provisions and
limitations (including penalties) as are applicable with respect to the
taxes from which such fund arose." It is clear that "subject to the
same provisions and limitations" modifies "shall be assessed, collected,
and paid." In the sense that the court reads "assessed, collected, and
paid," it embraces the process of assigning a priority in insolvency.
However, an alternative reading would limit the phrase to embrace
only a technical procedure, i.e., the tax collection steps set out in the
Internal Revenue Code.2 There are certain weapons available to the
government to compel payment.22 There are limitations on what the
government may assess, collect, and be paid: the government may not
be allowed to assess or collect certain penalties ;23 it may not be able
17. The sums would presumably not be carried as assets on the company books,
so that no creditor who examined a balance sheet would be deceived by the recognition of a trust fund.
18. 315 U.S. 510 (1942).
19. Section 64(a) (4) is the priority ordinarily granted to an unsecured claim for
taxes. United States v. New York involved no Chapter XI proceeding.

20. 315 U.S. at 515-16.

21. See generally INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 6001-6344. This reading seems to
be confirmed by the use of identical language in other sections of the Revenue Act
of 1934. E.g., ch. 277, § 311 (a), 48 Stat. 748.
22. For example, liens and seizure. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 6321-44.
23. Sections 6651-83 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 impose additional
taxes and penalties. One limitation would be that a penalty or an addition to tax
cannot be imposed if the taxpayer was not willfully negligent. E.g., id. at §§ 6651 (a),
6672. The Bankruptcy Act itself disallows collection of certain tax penalties. 11

U.S.C. § 93(j) (1964) (§ 57(j) of the Act).
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to collect interest in certain circumstances
by the statute of limitations.2 5

;24

its claim may be barred

If the Halo court's reading be adopted, what does the creation of
a trust fund avail the government? According to the Halo reasoning,
the government has no rights greater than those it would have as
collector of an ordinary tax debt due from the employer. If Congress
had intended this result, would it not more likely have characterized
the withholdings as "taxes due from the person withholding or collecting" than as a trust fund?
Section 7501 (a) was originally enacted as section 607 of the
Revenue Act of 1934.6 At that time there were no social security or
income tax withholdings by employers.27 When enacted, the section
covered such taxes as those to be withheld on bank checks and drafts 28
and on income of nonresident aliens,29 and those to be collected on
telephone, telegraph, radio, and cable messages,8 ° and on admissions. 8 '
The Senate Committee Report on the proposed bill 2 and the House
Conference Report on amendments to its proposed version" are quoted
by the Seventh Circuit as confirming that the major goal of enactment

of section 607 was to make available to the government certain favorable collection procedures; i.e., it was not a stressed goal to give the
government priority in cases of insolvency. Yet the reports are
equivocal. The Senate Report states that a change is sought so that
the withholder will no longer be a mere debtor, but can be treated as
a trustee and proceeded against by distraint. The House Report says
that the amendment will impress withheld taxes with a trust and will
make available certain administrative provisions applying to the assessment, collection, and payment of taxes.
In truth, this legislative history sheds little light on the Halo
problem. The court reaches the conclusion that, because the legislative reports do not specifically mention an intent to give the withheld
taxes a new status in bankruptcy, section 607 cannot do so. The court
24. E.g., INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6601(d). Or its interest may be limited in

amount. Id. at § 6601 (b). The Bankruptcy Act disallows interest on tax claims after
the date of the petition. 11 U.S.C. §§ 103(a)(1), (5) (1964) (§§ 63(a)(1), (5) of
the Act).
The second sentence of section 7501 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
might encompass minor bankruptcy limitations without embracing the section 64(a)
scheme. Nicholas v. United States, 384 U.S. 678 (1966), discussed in text accompanying notes 41-42 infra, seems to support this view. In Nicholas, the Supreme
Court clearly felt that interest on a withholding tax claim would stop at the date of
a liquidating petition, but declined to determine whether the tax claim would fall
within section 64(a) of the Bankruptcy Act
25. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6501 et seq. The Bankruptcy Act provides that
tax claims must be filed within six months after the first date set for the first meeting
of creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 93(n) (1964) (§ 63(n) of the Act).
26. 48 Stat. 768.
27. Social security tax withholding was authorized in 1935 (ch. 531, Title VIII,
§ 801, 49 Stat. 636), and income tax withholding was authorized in 1943 (ch. 120
§ 2(a), 57 Stat. 126).
28. Rev. Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 751, 47 Stat. 276. The tax was charged to the
account of the drawer.
29. Rev. Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 143(b), 48 Stat. 723.
30. Rev. Act of 1932, ch. 209, §§ 701-02, 47 Stat. 270. The tax was billed to the
caller. This section also taxed leased facilities.
31. First imposed by the War Revenue Act of 1917 (ch. 63, § 700, 40 Stat. 318).
32. S. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1934).
33. H.R. REP. No. 1385, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1934).
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apparently finds that Congress wished to continue its 1926 subordination of tax debts to administrative expenses.3 4 Yet, on its face, the
section does create a trust status; and the legislative history does not
in any express way qualify the status which it gives. That a trust
fund does not pass to the trustee's general creditors in bankruptcy
was first and firmly established in the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, " and
there seems to be no basis for concluding that Congress did not mean
to give the withholdings that character.
The cases cited by the court do not lend much support to its
statutory interpretation. The earliest case is In re Connecticut Motor
Lines, Inc.,"0 a 1964 decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit. That court's opinion concerned itself primarily with whether
the government's claim for withheld income and social security taxes
on wages earned prior to bankruptcy, but paid as second-priority
claims during bankruptcy, would fall under the first or fourth priority
in section 64(a) .7 Only summarily, at the end of the opinion, does
the court reject the government's trust fund theory.38 It does not explain its reasoning any further than to point to the second sentence of
section 7501 (a). It does not distinguish United States v. Sampsell,
Hercules Service Parts Corp. v. United States,4" or In re AirlineArista Printing Corp.41 - all earlier circuit court opinions which had
upheld the section 7501 (a) trust fund in bankruptcy.
The next case cited by the court is Nicholas v. United States.4"
The issue presented in Nicholas was whether the trustee in bankruptcy
could be compelled to pay the government interest which accrued after
the bankrupt's petition for liquidation on sums withheld during a prior
Chapter XI arrangement. One of the government's contentions was
that the interest on these withheld sums constituted a trust fund which
should pass to the government before any distribution to general creditors. It was only this contention which was rejected in Nicholas. The
Supreme Court expressly declined to determine whether the withheld
sums themselves would be subjected to the priorities in section 64(a) .4
The 1967 memorandum opinion in In re Green44 also contains
very little discussion of the reasoning behind its conclusion that the
second sentence of section 7501 (a) subjects the trust fund to section
64(a)'s priority scheme; it rests on the interpretation given in In re
Connecticut Motor Lines.4' Then it proceeds to hold that even if
34. See 3A W. CoLIER, supra note 11, at 64.0112.3].
35. 50 YALE L.J. 1268, 1269 (1941). "The inviolable nature of the valid trust
is apparently so well-settled that cases involving bankrupt trustees begin with it as an
assumption not open to dispute." Id. at n.10. See Williams v. Jackson, 107 U.S.
478 (1883).
36. 336 F2d 96 (3d Cir. 1964).
37. The Third Circuit concluded that the government's claim was not for costs
and expenses of administration, but was an ordinary tax claim under section 6 4 (a) (4).
38. 336 F.2d at 107.
39. 193 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1951).
40. 202 F.2d 938 (6th Cir. 1953).
41. 267 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1959), aff'g per curiam 156 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y.
1957).
42. 384 U.S. 678 (1966).
43. 384 U.S. at 691.
44. 264 F. Supp. 849 (D. Colo. 1967).
45. 336 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1964).
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that interpretation is incorrect, as between section 7501 (a) and section
64(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, section 64(a) should prevail. The court
makes the unembellished statement that "[w]e can read into § 7501 (a)
no Congressional intent to repeal, revise, or modify its 'strong' and
'beneficent' policy of subjecting the Government's tax claims to the
priorities established by § 64(a) of the Bankruptcy Act."4 6 As has
been pointed out, one might just as readily take section 7501(a) to
mean what it says: it creates a trustee status for the withholder.

II.

THE

TRUST

FUND

IN

BANKRUPTCY

If the Halo court's decision is, in fact, incorrect and if the section
7501 (a) trust fund should not be subject to section 64(a) priorities,
then what would be its status in bankruptcy? The ordinary rules for
cases where a trustee becomes bankrupt would presumably apply. As set
out in the comments to section 12 of the Second Restatement of Trusts,
Although a trustee becomes insolvent or bankrupt, the beneficiary

retains his interest in the subject matter of the trust if it can be
identified, or in its product if it can be traced into a product, and is
entitled thereto as against the general creditors of the trustee."7
The bankruptcy court will turn trust property over to its "true" owner,
the beneficiary, or to an appointed substitute trustee,4 s before paying
even the first priority creditors pursuant to section 64(a).
Tracing presents a serious problem. Although ordered by the
court as a debtor-in-possession to set up separate bank accounts for
its general, payroll, and tax indebtedness, Halo Metal Products did
not do so. There was no way for the government to point to the
withheld sums or to show where they had gone. In the usual bankrupt
trustee case, this would mean
that the beneficiary is reduced to the
49
status of a general creditor.
However, the Rassner line of cases cited by the court sets forth an
argument against a tracing requirement in the Halo situation. In City
of New York v. Rassnerj the Second Circuit was considering a statutory trust declared by the city for sales taxes collected by a restaurant
from its patrons. The court admitted that if the "trustee" had mingled
collected taxes with his own assets prior to bankruptcy, then the city
could not recover without tracing." However, where taxes had been
collected and mingled during the restaurant's operation as a Chapter
XI debtor-in-possession, the court found a tracing requirement undesirable. 2 During a Chapter XI arrangement, a debtor-in-possession
46. 264 F. Supp. at 852. Presumably the court is referring to the subordination
first occurring in 1926. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 12, comment f at 37 (1959).
48. See note 11 supra.
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 46, § 202(2) ; Comment, 32
YALE L.J. 267, 268 (1922). The same principle requires tracing where a principal
seeks to reach funds in the hands of his agent or where a bailor seeks to reach funds
in the hands of his bailee. See note 81-85 infra and accompanying text.
50. 127 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1942).
51. 127 F.2d at 705.
52. 127 F.2d at 705-06.
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is an officer of the court; he is "subject . . .at all times to the control
of the court and to such limitations, restrictions, terms, and conditions
as the court may from time to time prescribe." 53 Therefore, it ought
not to be countenanced that the trustee did not properly perform his
job; rather it should be presumed that he did not mingle the trust
funds with other monies and that he administered the funds properly.
The Rassner reasoning with respect to tracing was adopted by the
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Sampsell54 and by the Sixth Circuit
in Hercules Service Parts Corp. v. United States," both cases concerning withheld social security and income taxes. Rassner was
reaffirmed with respect to those taxes by the Second Circuit in In re
Airline-Arista Printing Corp.5 6
In addition to these cases, an examination of the nature of this
particular trust fund might strengthen an exception to the tracing
requirement. The employer holds the funds for no purpose other than
the convenience of the government. There is absolutely no excuse for
the trustee's mingling of funds with his own assets since he is given
no right to deal with them in any way."
3466 AND SECTION 64(a)
The Seventh Circuit opinion is not founded entirely on statutory
interpretation; it further rests on policy arguments. But in arguing
policy, the court strains to fit the withheld monies into a class of preferred debts in section 64(a) of the Bankruptcy Act. It includes an
argument that non-bankruptcy legislation, when it has attempted to alter
the section 64(a) scheme, has been unavailing. For support, the court
points to three Supreme Court cases. In Guarantee Title & Trust Co.
v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co.,8 the Supreme Court was being asked
to construe section 3466 of the Revised Statutes"9 as giving the
government a priority greater than that conferred by section 64(a) in
collecting, as an entirely unsecured claimant, a debt incurred by the
bankrupt on his own account. In Missouri v. Ross," the Court was
urged to construe section 64 itself to allow a state statute similar to
section 3466 to give Missouri a priority it did not have under an ordinary reading of section 64; in Davis v. Pringle,6" the United States
III.

SECTION

53. 11 U.S.C. § 742 (1964).
54. 193 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1951).
55. 202 F.2d 938 (6th Cir. 1953).
56. 267 F2d 333 (2d Cir. 1959), aff'g per curiam 156 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y.
1957). The district court reconsidered the earlier reasoning in Rassner in light of a
1952 amendment to section 64(a) (1) which created a sub-priority for administrative
expenses of a liquidating bankruptcy and which superseded an earlier debtor-relief
proceeding (see note 15 supra). It concluded that the amendment neither expressly
changed the Rassner rule nor evidenced a policy to chanqe it.
57. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3102, 3402 (1964).
58. 224 U.S. 152 (1912).
59. See note 13 supra.
60. 299 U.S. 72 (1936).
61. 268 U.S. 315 (1925).
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argued that section 3466 made its non-tax claim one embraced by
section 64's then-fifth priority. Only the Title Guaranty plaintiff
really attempted to skirt section 64(a) by non-bankruptcy legislation.
To agree with that case that, where there is an irreconcilable conflict
between non-bankruptcy and bankruptcy legislation, section 64(a)
ought to prevail does not, however, mean that one must also agree that
section 7501 (a) cannot create an effective trust in withheld monies.
There are many cases where the government has statutorily succeeded in raising itself above section 64(a)'s priority scheme.62 Where
the government has chosen to give itself lienor status,68 it has not
successfully been argued that there is any irreconcilable conflict with
section 64(a). Section 6 4 (a) is only one part of the Bankruptcy Act;
it applies only where a claim is unsecured; it has never purported to
dictate distribution apart from other sections of the Bankruptcy
Act. Section 70(a) 64 may allow some property to escape the trustee and general creditors completely: secured creditors will be allowed to satisfy claims from their security, 5 and ordinarily property
held by the bankrupt as trustee will be turned over to its beneficial
owner ° - all before section 64(a) begins to take effect.
The policy trends which form the third of the Halo court's arguments against the trust fund 7 are again, unfortunately, limited entirely to section 64(a). The court has not given consideration to
wider policy which would embrace secured claims.
62. E.g., United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956);
United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361 (1953); United States Y.
Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950).
63. The federal government's lien status is defined in INT. REv. CODE of 1954,

§i 6321-23.

64. 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1964).
65. See In re Meisel, 159 F. Supp. 879, 881 (D. Md. 1958). Section 57(h) of
the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 93(h) (1964), providing for such satisfaction, can be
traced back to section 20 of the 1867 Act. 3 W. COIER, supra note 11, at 157.01[1.3].
66. See note 11 supra.
67. The court traces two parallel lines of statutory development, one reducing and
limiting the priority accorded to taxes and the other giving increasingly favorable
treatment to administrative expenses:
1) Until 1926 taxes held the first priority in bankruptcy; in 1926 they were
reduced to the sixth priority. This position was retained in the 1938
Chandler Act, although renumbering and consolidation made the priority
fourth. The Chandler Act made taxes subject, for the first time, to the
general limitation period for filing claims. The Supreme Court's decision in
City of New York v. Saper, 336 U.S. 328 (1949), removed the exemption
of tax claims from the general prohibition of post-bankruptcy interest.
Finally, in 1964, section 64(a) (4) was amended to give fourth priority
only to taxes not released by a discharge in bankruptcy (and section
17(a) (1) was amended to make all tax claims dischargeable except those
accruing within three years preceding bankruptcy).
2) Until 1926 administrative expense claims were subordinate to tax claims;
in 1926 they were placed ahead of tax claims while remaining subordinate
to claims of the referee and of the creditors for costs of recovering or
preserving assets. In 1938 costs and expenses of administration were
placed in the first priority category, sharing pro rata with recovery and
preservation costs. In 1952 the administrative expenses of a liquidating
bankruptcy were given a sub-priority to those of a superseded debtorrelief proceeding.
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PRIORITIES

Criticism has been directed toward attempts by governmental
entities to raise their own status in insolvency, and that of favored
groups, 8 by the simple device of a legislative enactment. "9 The
criticism has been most effective when directed at state legislation."0
Because of our federal system, a state enactment which is regarded
as frustrating a federal one -

like the Bankruptcy Act -

must fall.

On the other hand, it is hard to argue that the federal government
cannot give itself whatever priorities it finds appropriate 71 (and by
a mere shuffling of words like "lien" or "trust fund") ;what it leaves for
other creditors might be looked upon as a matter of grace.
The declaration of a lien is a recognized device for raising a
creditor's place in the line of distributees in insolvency. Under section
67(b)' 2 of the Bankruptcy Act, certain statutory liens may be valid
even when acquired within four months of bankruptcy.73 Early bankruptcy legislation allowed statutory liens to consume the bankrupt's
estate. The astonishing variety of liens being created and the mounting
criticism from competing creditors led to important changes in the
Bankruptcy Act.74 Liens not good against a bona fide purchaser were
invalidated.75 Even as to validly recorded tax liens, in order to insure
payment of administrative expenses and small wage claims, section
67(c)(3) now reads, "[E]very tax lien on personal property not
accompanied by possession shall be postponed in payment to the debts
specified in clauses (1) and (2) of subdivision a of section 64 of
this Act .... ,,76 Congress has agreed that the declaration of a lien be it state or federal - ought not to have the effect of magic words;
it must be a bona fide lien and not a disguised priority with no foundation in fact.
77
As to the trust fund, it is a less familiar, but similar, device.
Policy could be said to require that the government's declared "trust"
not be allowed to carry away assets from other claimants, and especially
68. For example, laborers, materialmen, subcontractors, and landlords.
69. See, e.g., Smith, Title and the Right to Possession Under the Uniform Com-

mercial Code, 10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 39, 54-55 (1968) ; 40 IND. L.J. 233 (1965);
50 YALE L.J. 1268 (1941).

70. Since 1938 state-created priorities have not been honored in bankruptcy.
4 W. COLLIER, supra note 11, at 1167.20[2]. In Elliott v. Bumb, 356 F.2d 749 (9th
Cir. 1966), a California statute created a trust for the benefit of a principal in funds
received by a credit agent in the sale of checks and money orders. The statute did
not require tracing. The Ninth Circuit found that the statute was ineffective to set
up a priority in bankruptcy.

71. The Constitution gives Congress power to establish "Uniform Laws on the

subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
72. 11 U.S.C. § 107(b) (1964). This section applies to statutory liens in favor
of employees, contractors, mechanics, and other classes of persons and to certain
taxes and debts owing to the United States or any state.
73. A lien acquired by attachment, judgment, levy, or other legal or equitable
process within four months of bankruptcy is generally invalid. 11 U.S.C. § 107(a)
(1964) (§ 67(a) of the Act).
74. See 4 W. COLLIER, supra note 11, at 167.02[3].
75. 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)(b) (1964).
76. 11 U.S.C. § 107(c) (3) (1964).
77. The likeness is pointed out elsewhere. See Elliott v. Bumb, 356 F.2d 749
(9th Cir. 1966) ; 4 W. COLLIER, supra note 11, at ff 67.25[2]; 50 YALE L.J. 1268, 1271
(1941).
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from claimants falling into subdivisions (1) and (2) of section 64(a),

unless the trust has a rational basis in fact. If the analogy to a lien
is carried through, the government ought to allow subordination of
its trust claim whenever the trust has no such basis.
It can be argued that there is a certain falsity to any trust fund
claim. As alluded to in the tracing discussion, 78 there is no identifiable
"fund" at all. In fact, no money has ever been deposited with the
debtor by a third person. Unlike an ordinary trustee, an employer
like Halo has received only a credit or deduction from what it has had
to pay out to its employees. On the other hand, one might say that
Halo has received a quantity of labor rendered by its employees for
the benefit of the government. In this sense, Halo's asset-liability
balance has been favorably affected by the withholding scheme. Its
assets have been swelled. Halo, as tax collector, assumes the character
of a conduit.7" It has been remarked, in support of the validity in
bankruptcy of state statutory trusts imposed upon sales taxes collected
by the retailer, that the taxes "are related only superficially to the
retailer's normal economic activity, and the Bankruptcy Act is only
concerned with the equitable distribution of the ordinary fruits of
that activity."" The swelling of Halo's assets is due to the withholding scheme and is not "ordinary fruit" of Halo's business activity.
The bankrupt's position in collecting or withholding the taxes,
absent any statutory characterization as that of trustee, might be seen
as that of a bailee or agent for the government."' Collier defines a
bailment as "a delivery of goods for some purpose, upon a contract
express or implied to be redelivered to the bailor upon fulfillment of
the purpose or to be dealt with according to the bailor's direction" ;2
he defines an agency as "a relationship arising from a contract, express
or implied, by which one of the parties confides to the other the transaction or management of some business or other activity in his name,
or on his behalf, and whereby the other party assumes so to act and
to render an account thereof."8 " It would not be stretching these
definitions unduly to view the employer as a bailee or collecting agent
for the government. It is well settled that, as a general rule, if property
is in a bankrupt's hands as bailee or agent, the trustee will not take
title to it under section 70(a) (5) ;4 but the bailor or principal may
recover the property or its proceeds.8 5
78. See notes 49-57 supra and accompanying text.

79. Cf. Rivard v. Bijou Furniture Co., 67 RI. 251, 21 A2d 563 (1941) ; 40 IND.
L.J. 233, 238 (1965).
80. 40
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L.J. 233, 238 (1965).

81. Cf. Elliott v. Bumb, 356 F.2d 749, 754 (9th Cir. 1966).
82. 4A W. COLLIER, supra note 11, at U70.18[4].
83. Id. For elaboration of the duties of a collecting agent, see
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84. 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (5) (1964).
85. In re Klein, 3 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1924) ; Smith Wallace Shoe Co. v. Ternes,
235 F. 282 (8th Cir. 1916) ; In re John J. Kingsley, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 303 (D. Mass.),
aff'd sub noma., Nathanson v. Worcester Bank & Trust Co., 73 F.2d 889 (lst Cir.
1934); 4A W. COLLIER, supra note 11, at U 70.18[4]. Tracing is required. See
note 49 supra.
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All these aspects of the withholding tax situation refute arguments that the section 7501 (a) trust fund is a mere disguised priority.
Retention of bare legal title in the bankrupt is certainly not grossly
out of place.8 6 Like a lien which has attached to specific property, the
trust has a basis in fact.
V.

CONCLUSION

The opinions which have attempted to give a place in bankruptcy
to the trust fund under section 7501 (a) have never fully analyzed
the problem. They have not considered the many ways that the withholdings can be viewed; nor have they bothered to analogize or distinguish bankruptcy situations which are comparable - bailor, agent,
or secured creditor status. The main weakness of the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Halo seems to lie in its ready acceptance of the conclusion
in In Re Connecticut Motor Lines, Inc. that the second sentence of
section 7501 (a) subjects the trust fund to the bankruptcy priorities in
section 64(a). Despite the fact that the later portions of the opinion are
prefaced by the words "even if we accept arguendo the Government's
position that Section 7501 (a) is intended to grant trust fund taxes a
higher priority in bankruptcy than they are allowed by section 64(a) (1)
of the Bankruptcy Act, ' 8 T the court continues, as if wearing blinders,
to regard the government's status as falling within section 6 4 (a).
It may well be that it would be in accord with present views on
government priority to subordinate the federal claim in Halo to payment of administrative expenses. It might be time for bankruptcy
legislation which will deal with the trust, just as section 67 has dealt
with liens. But as the law stands, any final solution to the question
of the trust fund's status would require consideration of many more
aspects of the situation than have been dealt with to date.
86. 40
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L.J. 233, 238 (1965).

87. 419 F.2d at 1072.

